Personal Booklet of the Secret Agent of the Royal Italian Navy, "SIS" and "SID", Mario de Monte
Mario de Monte was born in Maiori, province of Salerno on 25 February 1899, he was the number one secret agent of the Royal Navy from 1939 to 1943 and directed the sophisticated apparatus of secret interceptions as Director of the SIS, acronym for "Information Service Secret" of the Royal Navy. Subsequently the armistice was appointed Director of the SID, acronym "Defense Information Service" of the RSI after Benito Mussolini established it in Salò, in October 1943, with decree no. 262 signed on 10/17/1943.
Mario de Monte, until the age of eighteen, had had a simple and carefree life, but he was, however, a brilliant and very applied student and, after finishing high school, he entered the Naval Academy of Livorno, leaving with the rank of Ensign. He was just over 20 years old when he took part, towards the end of the First World War, in the Adriatic campaign as a Submarine Commander.
Subsequently, with his promotion to corvette captain, he assumed command of the destroyers "Pantera" and "Leone" detached to East Africa.
The extraordinary story of this character as a secret agent began when towards the middle of August 1939, returning from Massaua, while disembarking in the port of Naples to reach Maiori and enjoy a well-deserved 30-day leave, he was blocked at the captain's office by an officer, who gave him a written order ordering him to report immediately to the Ministry of the Royal Navy, in Rome, for "special and urgent communications".
The young Captain de Monte showed up at the meeting with the leaders who had summoned him and after very confidential interviews, numerous tests and a short internship, his intuitive abilities that emerged from face to face with his superiors were assessed as first-rate and underlined also from an emerging officer duty status.
So it was that in early September, he began his new assignment in a Section of the "3B" Office of ISMA, the Secret Information Service which was located on the top floor of the Ministry of the Royal Navy in Rome.
De Monte immediately understood what the tasks of the information department were:
- Gathering news
- Enhancement
- Counter-espionage
These Sections were given a progressive number: the sections with odd numbers depended directly on de Monte and were those entrusted with more confidential tasks, such as activities abroad, military police, valorisation, personnel, internal organisation, technical services, monographs general and particular, checks etc. etc.
Twice a day, reports from naval attachés, consuls, officers on leave abroad, merchant navy officers or compatriots resident abroad were brought to de Monte's attention, reporting military, political, commercial and sometimes photographs of ships or stretches of coast or of military interest. Often from the espionage section came sketches or notes hastily written by spies or infiltrators on small sheets of paper.
De Monte's task was to extract from this news movements of warships, activities of armies, technical discoveries, etc., etc., precious elements for the Naval General Staff and the Technical Information Office.
Shortly thereafter, once his great abilities had been established, de Monte was entrusted with the reorganization of the information service. The sections with an even number, i.e. enhancement and dissemination of news, were brought together in a single office, whereas the uneven "Sections" were expanded into an "Office" with two or more Sub-Order Sections.
After a few weeks, de Monte was assigned a new assignment and moved from the even section of the valorization group to the odd section "5" or "interception" and "decryption", shortly thereafter renamed the Office of "Foreign Interceptions".
On this occasion, he was appointed (in conjunction with the departure of his colleague for a long mission in the Aegean) Deputy Chief of Office 3-B of Isma, the Secret Information Service of the Royal Navy. This Section was perhaps the most important and articulated and was made up of selected agents of the State secret police, the military police and the Carabinieri. Isma had been divided into "Front O" (Offense, i.e. espionage) and "Front D" (Defense-counter-espionage).
The "O Front" received information from the usual channels, i.e. reports from naval attachés, hired or volunteer agents and from daily consultation of the enemy or neutral press. On the contrary, the "Front D" based its activity on information obtained directly from the English thanks to a system of radio stations in permanent listening and in constant connection with the Rome headquarters.
Radio receptions, studies on frequencies, transmission procedures and study of call signs were the tasks of the "Foreign Information" section.
De Monte had the task of continuously following the flow of the enemy's naval and air activity in the Mediterranean, always having the updated position of the various units and their movements and studying the naval codes, in particular the tactical ones in order to arrive at a rapid deciphering and decoding of enemy messages.
In light of this, it should be noted that, in October 1942, he found himself at the head of one of the most important Kriegsmarine operations in the Mediterranean and issuing orders to U-boat commanders of the caliber of Albrecht Brandi. Furthermore, all secret messages directed to London were intercepted, decrypted by the senior specialists of the "3-D Sector" and, after being carefully evaluated by de Monte, passed to the chief admiral of the Isma. The section also had to take care of the security of the Italian codes.
The offices intended for foreign interceptions, inside the information service premises, were separated from the others by a glass door that was always closed and guarded by an armed soldier: it was a secret within the secret, a level of confidentiality taken to the extreme. To gain access, special authorization from the department head was required.
Mario De Monte scored the first big blow on 4 July 1940, unfortunately the effective work carried out by his office was not taken into proper consideration by the high command and the battle of Punta Stilo, instead of recording a sensational victory for our fleet, resulted in a "no stalemate". It had happened that de Monte's men had intercepted a message from the Command in Chief of the English Mediterranean Fleet, addressed to many Commands.
Decryption of the message revealed that it was intended for the battleship Warspite, the Cruiser Division Command and other Naval Group Commands. The message read as follows: from the Command in Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet to the Warspite Command - Cruiser Group Command (.....) - (.....) - (.....) Stop hours (...) of 9 July Force "A" miles... from Capo Spartivento stop Force "B"... Stop... The message was an operation order directed to four groups of ships and among these was the Battleships Division and a Heavy Cruiser Division.
At 12 noon on September 9, the four groups must have found themselves staggered parallel to the coast of Sicily, approximately on the meridian of Cape Spartivento. It was understood that this operation was aimed at bombing the coastal cities of Catania, Syracuse and perhaps Augusta.
On 5 July the Naval General Staff ordered the use of a large part of the Italian Fleet, reconnaissance to the Royal Air Force and the aerial bombardment forces, information on the operation was sent aimed at preventing the ships of the Italian Fleet from being mistaken for enemies.
Orders to the Submarines to be in time in the positions through which the English Naval Divisions would have to pass. Order to the Bases to prepare supplies and support services. On the morning of the 9th, thanks to de Monte, the Royal Navy was ready to counter what would probably have been one of the most devastating attacks by the English Navy.
In the excited hours of waiting that separated the arrival of the English Naval Fleet, de Monte managed to intercept a very urgent Telegram from an English plane, which he transmitted to the Command in Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet, the text, in conventional language, reported: " Battleships Cruisers Destroyers enemies in large numbers 14 by 320 miles from you. Stop. 2.40 pm.
Not only did de Monte manage to intercept the message but he communicated to the Italian Fleet the exact position in which the English Fleet was located, i.e. 14 miles by 320. Unaware of being intercepted, the English pilot continued to transmit the de Monte continuously and punctually Monte managed to intercept his messages, thus keeping the General Staff updated. Thanks to these interceptions, what would have been the "surprise" effect was negated and in fact the losses suffered by the Italian Navy were insignificant: after about half an hour the battle of Punta Stilo ceased. The de Monte was at the center of what is the largest battle of the Second World War, as never again have such large naval forces been in contact.
De Monte's great abilities in carrying out his duties were once again confirmed with another extraordinary result: this was obtained in the spring of 1942 when the "Charity Fishing" operation was happily successful, entrusted and managed by de Monte and by Captain Eliseo Porta.
They organised, planning it in great secrecy, a highly risky mission for which a simple fishing vessel, the "Maria Rosa", specially equipped for this operation, was used. The fishing vessel, with special diving equipment on board and staff made up of secret agents and expert divers, set sail from the small port of Trapani towards Cape Bon, on the Tunisian coast, where the British destroyer was lying at a depth of 20 metres. Mohawk” torpedoed months earlier by the Italians.
While some kept an eye on the coast guarded by the French, others prepared the diver for the dive. It dived for hours in an attempt to recover from the wreck the secret ciphers and the "Signal Book" and regulations of the radiotelegraph service in use in the Royal Navy, which the commander of the "Mohawk" had not had time to destroy. If successful, the mission would have made the route of Italian-German supplies to the fighting armies in Africa safer. Fortunately, the mission had an extremely favorable success as the reading of a secret document also allowed us to identify a dangerous English agent who had infiltrated our bases.
After 8 September 1943, the day on which the armistice was signed and Italy's unconditional surrender to the allies, the Secret Information Service was completely disintegrated and it was actually the Germans, on the basis of the collaboration prior to 8 September, to fully manage Section "B" in collaboration also with the Italians Mario de Monte and Giuseppe Donini who were sent to Berlin with the evacuation of Rome and included in the SID of the RSI. Section "C" analysis and evaluation and "E" counter-espionage destroyed all the documents in the archive on that date. Only Section "D" continued to operate, the initial nucleus of the SIS which operated clandestinely from 8 September 1943 to 5 June 1944.
When he retired, Mario de Monte wrote a book, one part "diary" and the other "fictional" which aroused much interest and encouraged the director Francesco de Robertis, former Frigate Captain, to make, in 1954, the film " Shadow Men” with the story and screenplay entrusted to the same author as the book. The cinematic spy story revolves around an Italian Navy officer (a very young Giorgio Albertazzi) seduced by an attractive foreigner (Mara Lane) on behalf of the English counter-espionage:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_vaA32_0jQY
Personal booklet by Mario De Monte, the 007 from Maiori (Salerno) who spied on the English troops.
Part 1 - legal status of service
MARIO DE MONTE born on 25 February 1899 in Maiori, province of Salerno, to Vincenzo de Monte and Ida Pages.
Promoted to Lieutenant with effect from 16 December 1921, in the same year serving at the Submarine School Command in Pola and embarked on the Royal Ship Trinacria.
Promoted to Lieutenant Commander with seniority on 11 April 1929.
With the rank of Commander of the Corvette, he was Commander of the Royal Submarine Vettor Pisani, from 30 September 1932 to 1 August 1933.
Promoted to Frigate Captain with seniority on 1 July 1935
Part 2 - Destinations
From 1 September 1931 to 18 January 1922, he was embarked on the Royal Submarine "F15".
From 20 January 1922 to 14 April, on the Royal Ship "Trinacria".
From 15 April 1922 to 10 June 1923 Royal Submarine "F15".
From 11 June 1923 to 31 July 1923, Royal Submarine "F15".
From 1 August 1923 to 31 October 1923 Royal Submarine "F14".
From 1 November 1923 to 5 March 1924, Royal Ship "Trinacria".
From 6 March 1924 to 31 May 1926, Royal Explorer "Leone".
From 1 June 1926 to 31 October 1927, Royal Submarine "Torricelli".
From 1 November 1927 to 12 January 1928, Royal Submarine "F21".
From 12 January 1928 to 19 January 1929, Royal Submarine "H2".
From 20 January 1929 to 11 April 1929 Royal Torpedo Boat "41 PN".
From 12 April 1929 to 15 October 1929, Royal Submarine "F18".
On land, at the LSO Office, from 16 October 1929 to 14 October 1931.
From 15 December 1931 to 28 August 1933, Royal Submarine "Vettor Pisani".
From 29 August 1933 to 31 October 1933, Royal Destroyer "Confienza".
From 1 November 1933 to 15 June 1934, Royal Destroyer "San Martino".
On land, from 16 June 1934 to 5 March 1936, at the Navy Monastery, General Directorate of Military Service Personnel.
From 5 March 1936 to 18 April 1937, Royal Cruiser "Montecuccoli".
From 30 March 1938 to 15 January 1939, Royal Explorer "Pantera" (Red Sea) Italian East Africa (A.O.I.).-
From 16 January 1939 to 11 August 1939, Royal Destroyer "Leone" (Red Sea) Italian East Africa (A.O.I.).
Last known recorded destination: Maristat - Information Department - as of 28 August 1939.
Part 3 - Biographical and Miscellaneous Information
Knight of the Crown of Italy by Royal Decree 27 October 1930 (Art.1-7.0.28-29 October 1930 A. E.F. 9.
Appointed Knight of the Holy Order. Maurizio and Lazaro, with Royal Decree 3 June 1938.
Authorized to bear the commemorative badge for military operations in non-isolated services abroad.
Commander of the Crown of Italy for merit in the 1942 war campaigns.
From 24 July 1942 appointed Captain of Vessel.
The RSI Secret Services from 1943 to 1945
Organization of the information services of the Italian Social Republic that Mussolini established in 1943 in Salò under the protection of his German ally.
The RSI secret services were established in Rome in October 1943, with decree n.262 and signed on 10/17/43.
His tasks were:
* direct action in favor of CSR;
* promiscuous action also in favor of the German Armed Forces;
* exclusive action for the benefit of the German Armed Forces.
The bodies responsible for the RSI information service were the following:
1) Ministry of Defense;
2) SID, acronym for Defense Information Service, directed by Gen.div.Vittorio Foschini;
3) Information Office of the ENR or National Republican Army;
4) Information Office of the ANR or National Republican Air Force;
5) Information Office of the MNR or National Republican Navy;
6) Political Investigative Office (UPI);
7) Information Service of the X^ Mas;
8) Information Service of the Republican Police;
9) Political Information Repression Service (SPIR);
10) PFR Information Service;
11) Information Services of the Ministry of the Interior;
12) Information Service of the Financial Police of col. Luigi Finarda;
13) Secret Services - Silver Foxes - Founded by Dr. De Santis and directed by Lt. Col. Tommaso David.
Below is the SID organizational chart:
Head of the SID
SID/Army: directed by Lt. Col. Cosmacini and Maj. Walter Magagnalo
SID/Navy: directed by Cap.Vasc. Mario de Monte and Capt. Vasc. Barter
SID/Air Force: directed by Col. Ferruccio Vosilla and Gen. Buggero Bonomi
General Affairs Office: directed by Gen. Figarolo and Col. Germanis
Administrative Department: Maj. Satta
TAV Technical Department
Zeta Department: censorship II
Alpha Section: with the Espionage Department and Counter-espionage Department
Beta section: encryption
Sigma section: politics
Delta Section: CS
Omega Section: censorship
Kappa section: links
Jota section: interception
Safety and protection section - field post - car squad
Peripheral centres
German Liaison Office: Maj. Von Griesheim
Liaison office Ministry of Foreign Affairs
It should be underlined that Vittorio Foschini became, after the end of the conflict, a secret official of the PCI and the communist paramilitary structure.
Towards the end of 1943 the SID was transferred from Rome to Volta Mantovana.
Circular 1326/SM/Secreto specified the functions of the SID:
Military Police counter-espionage action
Actual counter-espionage action
Anti-sabotage action
Anti-gang action
Action against subversive and anti-national propaganda in the Armed Forces
Action for the search and capture of escaped enemy prisoners of war
Action in censorship
The CS Centers of the SID were the following: Turin, Milan, Padua, Genoa, Bologna, Ancona, Florence and Rome.
Furthermore, the SID was equipped with a CREN or News Processing Collection Center which took care of issuing a daily newsletter in 46 copies.